The United States and the Two Koreas, 1969-2000: An Historical Overview

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Essay

Introduction:

In the summer of 2010, the United States and its ally, South Korea, will mark the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean War. When Kim Il Sung’s North Korean forces launched an artillery barrage across the 38th Parallel dividing North and South Korea in the early hours of June 25, 1950, followed by tank and infantry attacks across the border, the political and security situation on the Korean Peninsula was irrevocably altered. The war entered a new phase, with much greater risk of escalation, when Chinese forces crossed the Yalu River in support of Pyongyang in October 1950. It would take two-and-a-half more years of costly fighting and contemplation of the use of nuclear weapons against the communist forces before the U.N.-sanctioned “police action” ended with an armistice signed on July 27, 1953, by the United States, North Korea, and China, which left the peninsula divided along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).¹

This uneasy truce, with the potential for renewed hostilities across the tense and heavily fortified DMZ, is possibly the most critical unresolved dilemma created by the Cold War for the United States and its allies. The continued division of the peninsula presents an unstable situation that has repeatedly threatened both regional and world security. This collection of recently-declassified U.S. government records, obtained by The National Security Archive’s Korea Project, sheds important new light on how the United States sought to manage these political and security challenges between 1969 and 2000. As will be discussed below, there is a vital need for greater access to records of U.S. policy-making toward the two Koreas to support historical and international relations research on the troubled history of the peninsula and the U.S. role in confronting the North Korean security challenge, and on the often tumultuous political history of South Korea as well.

The years covered by the document set, from the Nixon to the Clinton administrations, saw many significant turning points in the development of these interlinked political and security themes. The focus on these years also serves to provide a much-needed enlargement of the available declassified documentation on U.S. policy-making, moving as it does beyond the years covered to date by the State Department’s official record of U.S. diplomacy, the Foreign Relations of the United States series.² The documents have already provided the basis for new historical studies of the interplay of great power diplomacy on the Korean peninsula, and it is hoped they will support new scholarship on this crucial foreign policy issue.³

The Need for Greater Access to the Policy-Making Record

Before discussing some of the key events and issues that are the focus of the documents in this set, it is useful to provide additional background on the basic contribution access to such documents can make to scholarly study and analysis of these topics. As both history and recent developments have underscored, U.S. engagement in the peninsula and the long-term strategic interests in Northeast Asia served by this engagement present complex challenges, requiring Washington to frame and pursue its strategic goals against the backdrop of a more
independent-minded South Korean ally and the roles and objectives of major regional powers, most notably China, Japan, and Russia. U.S. efforts have moved on parallel tracks, involving the long-standing alliance with Seoul as it followed its difficult path from authoritarian military rule to democracy, and the continued struggle to penetrate the veils of secrecy, apparent paranoia and unpredictable behavior that have characterized the Stalinist-style regime of Kim Il Sung and his son, Kim Jong Il.

Unfortunately, discussion on U.S. policy toward the two Koreas has all too often been characterized by heated polemics, hyperbole and caricatures of positions and players, rather than nuance and a concern for context and complexity. Moreover, to all public appearances U.S. policies on Korea seem to be made often in an ad hoc, reactive manner, driven by events or the desire to distinguish one administration's policies from its predecessors, rather than with an eye to long-term continuities and trends. The challenge for scholars is to provide a more subtly-shaded, empirically-rich, and contextualized analysis of the issues that policy-makers often have neither the time nor the inclination to make, and political scientists often have little motivation to provide, given the current professional priority upon methodological and theoretical rigor over nuance and context grounded in empirical detail. For example, many studies in the international relations literature have analyzed the Korean situation by assessing the applicability of various theoretical constructs, such as realism or regime theory, to see how the behavior of a state can be explained by the predictive power of these theories.

Most if not all examinations of the policy challenges facing the United States and its allies in Korea emphasize that the logical and necessary starting point is the determination of respective national interests that can be affected, for good or ill, by developments on the peninsula and their repercussions throughout the wider region. Preventing the renewed outbreak of war is one obvious goal, to which has been added since the last half of the 1990s the need to anticipate and if necessary guard against possible scenarios in which the North Korean regime collapses as the result of its mounting economic ills, and in the process lashes out militarily or otherwise destabilizes the region through the ripple effects emanating from its collapse. Since 1993, the renewed nuclear threat from North Korea has drawn urgent attention from policy-makers and analysts seeking to forestall potentially destabilizing effects on the peninsula and to meet broader proliferation threats resulting from Pyongyang's selling of its nuclear assets and know-how for hard currency or other forms of economic assistance. Here, the debate has repeatedly revolved around the twin issues of discerning North Korea's ultimate objectives and the proper modes and goals for U.S. engagement, including the issue of whether to provide "rewards" for continued failures to live up to earlier commitments, even though the alternative to negotiation may be conflict.

Finally, there are the changing dynamics of the bilateral relationship at the heart of these interrelated issues -- the U.S.-South Korea alliance -- which must build upon its Cold War security foundations, as well as overcome the historical legacy of U.S. support for authoritarian South Korean governments that ran roughshod over political dissent and human rights. Here, a major challenge today is to find a policy that allows greater scope for the South Korean desire to take a more independent path, congruent with what Seoul sees as its national interests, as opposed to following an American lead that has aroused suspicion and opposition from both the public and intellectuals. The areas in which South Korea has demonstrated a desire and ability to follow a more nationalistic approach include relations not only with North Korea prior to any possible reunification, but also with the other key Asian powers, most notably Japan and China.

Major Document Set Themes
Efforts to analyze and understand these complex issues can and should be informed by the study of historical antecedents. This document set provides a significant addition to the body of declassified primary records for a period that featured a rich array of significant events and related issues: North Korea’s downing of the U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane in the spring of 1969; President Park Chung Hee’s decision to impose martial law in 1972; the ax murders of U.S. soldiers by North Korean military troops in the infamous 1976 DMZ tree-cutting incident; the moves during the Carter administration to withdraw U.S. troops from Korea; the 1979 assassination of President Park and the ensuing military coup; the 1980 Kwangju uprising, the imprisonment of and death sentence given to leading political dissident Kim Dae Jung and their impact on U.S.-South Korea relations; the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994 and the succession of Kim Jong Il; the progressive growth of popular democracy in South Korea, highlighted by the elections of Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung; the 1980 Kwangju uprising, the imprisonment of and death sentence given to leading political dissident Kim Dae Jung and their impact on U.S.-South Korea relations; the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994 and the succession of Kim Jong Il; the economic crisis in North Korea and the moves towards engagement marked by President Clinton’s major policy review; and of course the recurrent crises engendered by the North Korean nuclear weapons program.

While it is not possible here to discuss all of these events and issues in detail, they do sort into two main themes: U.S. efforts, usually in concert with South Korea and other allies, to meet the security challenge posed by North Korea; and U.S. interest in promoting political liberalization in South Korea. As the history of these two inter-related themes reveals, Washington often faced a difficult balancing act in trying to deal with both issues. The U.S. security guarantee to Seoul could and did run athwart of American aspirations for greater democratization in South Korea, creating a troublesome legacy in South Korean perceptions that the U.S. had too often supported repressive governments in the pursuit of stability on the peninsula. The following subsections provide an overview of how this document set can contribute to our understanding of these topics.

The North Korean Security Challenge from Nixon to Clinton

While the two main themes outlined above weave in and out of U.S.-Korean relations, often in an interacting fashion, it is useful to separate them for purposes of discussion, starting with the seemingly perpetual challenge to security and stability on the Korean peninsula. The dictatorships of Kim Il Sung, who ruled from the time of the nation’s creation following World War II until his death in 1994, and his son, Kim Jong Il, have added additional layers to Churchill’s famous description of Russia as “a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.” The leadership style of Kim father and son has been marked by an emphasis on a Stalinist-style cult of personality, an isolated totalitarian regime seemingly obsessed with protecting its population from contamination by outside influences, characterized by ideological fervor and rigidity, violent rhetorical attacks on foes and allies alike, unpredictability, and a penchant for risk-taking and brinksmanship that have been judged irrational by some observers. However, there were also occasional signs of an underlying rationality and willingness to negotiate -- once it became clear that threats and bluster would not necessarily secure the recognition and assistance Pyongyang felt were its due.\(^{12}\)

The Korea document set sheds new light on numerous facets of the U.S. effort to deter the North Korean military threat, to understand the regime’s motivations and goals, to follow Pyongyang’s relations with other governments, and to assess the political and economic stability of the communist regime, a concern that took on new prominence in the 1990s. A crisis early in President Nixon’s first term underscored the difficulties involved with deterring North Korean military adventurism. A year before Nixon took office, in January 1968, Pyongyang had
demonstrated its willingness to carry out risky military actions against the United States and South Korea: first by mounting a raid by North Korean commandos on the Blue House in an attempt to assassinate President Park, and then by seizing the USS Pueblo in international waters.\textsuperscript{13} Nixon had his own experience with this unpredictable risk-taking behavior in April 1969, when North Korean MiG fighters shot down a U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane over the Sea of Japan.\textsuperscript{14} Nixon’s decision not to retaliate militarily (a decision National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger later criticized as weak and indecisive) was rooted in the absence of viable options that did not carry the threat of escalation or even war on the peninsula. To address this lack, Nixon had the Joint Chiefs work during the spring and summer of 1969 on new contingency plans. As documented in this set, what emerged was a set of nearly 25 options, up to and including both limited nuclear strikes using 10 to 70 kiloton nuclear weapons (and possible casualties in the thousands) and all-out war against Pyongyang.\textsuperscript{15}

The search for military options was further complicated by another recurring theme in U.S. policy: the effort to reduce the American force commitment to South Korea without either engendering fears that the U.S. defense guarantee was weakening or encouraging even further North Korean adventurism.\textsuperscript{16} Nixon’s decision in 1970 to withdraw 20,000 troops, a move in line with his Manila, or Nixon, Doctrine calling on U.S. allies to carry more of the mutual defense burden, is discussed in a number of the documents.\textsuperscript{17} Other materials provide the strategic framework for U.S. defense planning regarding South Korea, as well as discussions of U.S. military aid to South Korea and the latter’s contributions towards the war in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{18}

As might be expected, indications that the U.S. was considering any reduction in its troop commitment to South Korea caused deep concern and protests in Seoul, whose President Park never passed up an opportunity to remind Washington of the intractable military threat he faced across the narrow DMZ. The topic was high on Park’s agenda when he met with President Nixon in San Francisco in August 1969, and as the Nixon administration continued to discuss possible force withdrawals it had to balance this with commitments to support modernization of South Korea’s forces.\textsuperscript{19} This issue would bring bilateral relations close to the breaking point under President Jimmy Carter, who entered office determined to cut the U.S. military presence on the peninsula. A combination of new intelligence assessments indicating a significant increase in North Korea’s military capabilities and behind-the-scenes efforts by senior national security advisers finally persuaded the president to put the withdrawals on hold during a chilly summit meeting with Park in Seoul in the summer of 1979, during which Carter grew ever more frustrated and angry as Park lectured him at length on why a troop withdrawal would be a disastrous mistake.\textsuperscript{20} Efforts to reassure Seoul about the U.S. defense commitment would remain a constant refrain in the relationship under future administrations.

Perhaps the greatest challenge for the U.S.-South Korea security relationship was figuring out how to deter a foe that was capable of provocations leading to lethal results. Two examples of such actions were the infamous killing of two U.S. soldiers in 1976 stemming from a fight over the cutting down of a tree in the DMZ; and the attempt by North Korean army officers to assassinate President Chun Doo Hwan in the Rangoon bombing in October, 1983, which killed the foreign minister and three other cabinet members.\textsuperscript{21} Efforts to plumb the thinking, motivations and goals of the North Korean leadership form the focus of numerous intelligence and diplomatic assessments contained in this set, including a valuable collection of brief reports and analyses prepared by the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research.\textsuperscript{22} Another subject of perennial significance for U.S. analysts and policy-makers that is covered by these materials is Pyongyang’s relationships with Russia, China, and other governments.\textsuperscript{23}
The most daunting and critical task of understanding North Korea’s intentions and goals has centered on the still unresolved security challenge posed by its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. Even before U.S. intelligence reports began assessing signs of a nuclear program in the mid-1980s, one of Washington’s primary policy goals had been to persuade South Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons aspirations during the 1970s, and working with Seoul thereafter to help develop a nuclear power industry with adequate safeguards. While intelligence assessments of North Korea’s nuclear activities remain wrapped tightly in secrecy, the set does contain a number of documents dealing with the U.S. effort to coordinate policy with South Korea and other concerned parties, primarily Russia and China, to persuade North Korea to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as an agreement on implementing IAEA safeguards allowing on-site inspections. The first act in this drama reached a promising conclusion in late 1991, when, with crucial prompting provided by President George H.W. Bush’s decision to withdraw from the field all U.S. tactical or theater nuclear weapons, North and South Korea issued a joint statement promising to create a nuclear-free zone on the peninsula, and Kim Il Sung signed an IAEA safeguards agreement (having agreed to the NPT six years earlier).

The set also provides documentation on the next, and potentially more explosive, act in the nuclear saga that began when the IAEA reported discrepancies in Pyongyang’s submission on its nuclear program, and North Korea responded in March 1993 by announcing its intention to withdraw from the NPT. Though he agreed later that year to reconsider, Kim Il Sung reversed his decision once again the following year. This crisis, which led the Clinton administration to give serious consideration to military strikes to take out the country’s nuclear facilities, was resolved only after former President Carter travelled to Pyongyang where he reached an accord with Kim Il Sung that led to the 1994 Framework Agreement. Under this accord, North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear weapons program in exchange for shipments of heavy oil and, most importantly, assistance from the U.S. and other governments in building light-water reactors to supply the nation’s power needs.

The Clinton administration saw significant progress in relations with North Korea following the Framework Agreement, though toward the end of the decade domestic political opposition to its North Korea policy began to build. This prompted the creation of a task force under former Secretary of Defense William Perry to propose a roadmap for combining continued progress on arms control issues with the progressive relaxation of economic sanctions on Pyongyang. Documents in the set provide new information on such key events as the joint call by the U.S. and South Korea for talks leading to a formal peace treaty ending the Korea War, Kim Dae Jung’s historic trip to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong Il, and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s equally historic meeting with the North Korean leader in October 2000.

In a fascinating counter-point to these positive developments, a number of intelligence assessments in the 1990s started to express doubts about North Korea’s long-term economic viability in the face of serious problems, including a severe food shortage. U.S. analysts often expressed puzzlement at how the communist regime managed to retain power. All in all, U.S.-North Korean relations seemed headed in a new and more promising direction as Clinton left office, even though he had to decline an invitation to visit Pyongyang before his term ended. This promise would remain unfulfilled under George W. Bush as Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions, supposedly buried by the 1994 Framework Agreement, revived the nuclear crisis in the new century.

*Balancing Democratization with Security: The U.S. and South Korea’s Troubled Political History*
While the security threat presented by North Korea has been the central challenge facing the U.S. on the peninsula, a second challenge to political stability existed in the form of the troubled political development of South Korea. If unaddressed, this issue held the potential of encouraging Pyongyang to engage in further destabilizing diplomatic and military provocations. The difficult transition from the authoritarian military-backed regime of Park Chung Hee through periods of martial law, assassinations, military coups and repressive governments to an era of popularly-elected leaders with deep roots in the political reform movement has been a constant source of worry for U.S. policy-makers, though more for some than others. 31 U.S. concerns and objectives are discussed in the many documents available that pertain to high-level meetings, including those between heads of state. The Korea set provides extensive insights into these meetings and how the U.S. assessed and responded to key events and issues, including:

- President Nixon’s meeting with Park Chung Hee in August 1969. 32
- Park Chung Hee’s imposition of martial law in 1972. 33
- The Carter administration’s emphasis on human rights and political reform in South Korea. 34
- The assassination of Park in 1979 and the subsequent military coup. 35
- The 1980 Kwangju Uprising and arrest of leading political dissidents. 36
- The Reagan-Chun turning-point meeting in February 1981. 37
- Other high-level bilateral meetings during the 1980 and early 1990s, including visits by presidents Reagan and Bush, as well as by Secretary of State Shultz. 38
- Detailed U.S. embassy reporting on the political situation in South Korea and the moves toward political reform and greater democracy, including presidential elections. 39
- U.S.-South Korea economic relations, including the impact of the Asian Economic Crisis. 40
- Clinton administration meetings with South Korean Leaders Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung and their cabinet ministers. 41

As these documents reveal, the emphasis on pressing the military-backed governments waxed and waned under different administrations. For Nixon and Ford, the balance tilted in favor of the security relationship, although State and the intelligence agencies kept a close eye on the potential for political dissent to escalate into protests and wider instability. President Carter would bring the issue of human rights and the need for political reform front and center in his dealings with President Park, adding to the already serious strain caused by Carter’s push to withdraw U.S. forces from Korea. The assassination of Park in 1979 and the subsequent military coup that brought Chun Doo Hwan to power created new strains in the relationship, especially after Chun’s government imposed martial law, arrested leading dissidents (including Kim Dae Jung, who was sentenced to death for sedition), and brutally put down the student protests in Kwangju.

President Ronald Reagan entered office bent on restoring U.S. security alliances around the world, which provided an opening for placing U.S.-South Korea relations on a new and firmer
footing. He used his meeting with President Chun in February 1981 to reassure him about the U.S. security guarantee and that the new administration would view human rights issues in the “proper manner,” which meant refraining from public criticism of Chun’s regime and offering encouragement in private to advance political reform. Such quiet diplomacy did secure a pardon for Kim Dae Jung, a _quid pro quo_ for Chun’s invitation to visit the White House and the result of behind-the-scenes negotiations by Reagan’s incoming national security advisor, Richard Allen, with South Korean diplomats and military officials in late 1980. Still, Reagan’s warm embrace of Chun fostered deep-rooted distrust of the United States within the political reform movement.

Under Reagan and his successor, George H.W. Bush, the same combination of strong public support for an ally coupled with private coaching of Chun and his hand-picked successor, Roh Tae Woo, did produce some progress. Chun kept his word on stepping down at the end of his term and worked with the dissident movement to revise the constitution to institute elections for the presidency by popular vote. Still, the real victory for political reform would not come until the election of Kim Young Sam in December 1992 and of Kim Dae Jung in 1997. The South Korean courts passed judgment on the Chun/Roh era, and by implication on U.S. support of these two leaders, when in 1996 the two former presidents were tried and convicted for their roles in the 1979 military coup and brutal repression of the 1980 Kwangju uprising. In a move designed to promote political healing, President-elect Kim Dae Jung joined with outgoing President Kim Young Sam to pardon both former leaders in 1997.

As the century drew to an end, South Korea seemed well on the way to putting behind it the legacy of authoritarian political rule and repression of dissent that had marked so much of the nation’s post-war history. This growing political maturity would pose its own problems for the U.S.-South Korean relationship, as Seoul increasingly sought to assert its own views, and politicians found it useful at times to tap the vein of anti-Americanism still running through popular South Korean views of America as the result of the U.S. support for earlier authoritarian regimes. Taken with the continuing challenges posed by North Korea, even after the positive trends of the 1990s, the U.S.-South Korean relationship would continue to demand the attention of U.S. leaders and policy-makers in the ongoing effort to bring real peace to the long-troubled peninsula.

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4 Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, _Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies_ (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 1-5 for discussion of the often emotionally-charged nature of the public debate over U.S. policies toward Korea. Their book is one effort to move beyond this polarized and often caricature-laden debate and to provide some of the needed contextual empirical detail and nuance.

5 Cha and Kang, _Nuclear North Korea_, 10, 162. These shifts can create problems for America’s interlocutors in East Asia who are trying to discern U.S. intentions; see Victor Cha, _Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle_ (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1999), wherein Cha develops an analysis that lays stress upon perceptions by Japan and South Korea of the relative threat of entrapment or abandonment within their alliances with the U.S. Cha explores how symmetries or asymmetries in this perception can affect the two nations’ tendencies toward cooperation or antagonism with each other, which can directly affect the U.S. ability to pursue its interests in the region.


7 A good collection of essays that explores the different analytical frameworks (balance of power, regimes, etc.) for Asian security issues, including Korea, may be found in *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features*, edited by Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). Eberstadt and Ellings, *Korea's Future and the Great Powers* is one example of a realist approach stressing the primacy of national interest in analyzing and determining U.S. policy goals in Korea. For an interesting effort to blend theoretical approaches, in this case inter-alliance dynamics, with historical analysis to explore the record of U.S.-South Korean-Japan interactions on the security situation in the region, see Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*. Another recent effort to blend historical and theoretical approaches to the regional security issues is Aaron L. Friedberg, "Will Europe's Past Be Asia's Future?" *Survival*, 42, no. 3 (autumn 2000), 147-159, which takes as its backdrop the realist vs. liberal debate on international politics and the roots of war and peace.

8 See for example Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard J. Ellings, "Assessing Interests and Objectives of Major Actors in the Korean Drama," in Eberstadt and Ellings, op. cit. This emphasis upon the priority of first establishing U.S. national interest is implicit if not explicit in practically all the political science literature, not just that addressing Korea. The political science/policy analysis literature on Korea is vast; see for example the works cited in the books by Cha and Kang, Cha, Eberstadt and Ellings, and Alagappa, cited earlier.


For detailed discussion of the North Korean leadership and its negotiating style see Snyder, *Negotiating on the Edge*, and Downs, *Over the Line*, op. cit. The chapters by Gregg Brazinsky and Sergey Radchenko in Wampler, ed., *Trilateralism and Beyond*, provide good analyses of the often perplexing and frustrating experiences of Beijing and Moscow in dealing with Pyongyang. The North Korea International Documentation Project, housed at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, is a superb source of documents from the archives of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations on their relations with North Korea.

On the U.S. response to the seizure of the *USS Pueblo*, see for example Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “Record of Meeting on January 25, 1968 in re U.S. response to the “Pueblo” capture,” “Report on Meeting of Advisory Group [in re Pueblo Incident],” January 29, 1968; Memorandum, “Meeting with the President, Tuesday, January 30, 1968, 8:30 a.m. – Presentation to Congressional Leadership: The PUEBLO case, January 29, 1968.” North Korea released the surviving members of the *Pueblo* and the bodies of the deceased in December 1968. The North Korea International Documentation Project hosted a conference on these two crises, as well as the EC-121 crisis of 1969; see materials available online at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=230972&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=474761.


For a good discussion of the internal U.S. debates over American force levels in South Korea from the 1950s through the Clinton administration, see William Stueck’s contribution to Wampler, ed., *Trilateralism and Beyond*.


19 On the Nixon-Park meeting in San Francisco, see for example Memorandum, Eliot to Kissinger, “Visit of President Park Chung Hee of Korea,” August 11, 1969; Memorandum, Secretary of State to the President, “Your Meeting with President Park Chung Hee of Korea, August 21, 1969, 11:30 a.m.” August 17, 1969; and Memorandum, Kissinger to the President, “Your Meetings with President Park,” August 20, 1969. See also the Stueck chapter in Beyond Trilateralism for a good assessment of the Nixon administration’s ongoing internal discussions about further troop withdrawals from South Korea.


A few redacted documents have been released; see for example Article [possibly from the CIA], "North Korea: Nuclear Reactor," July 9, 1982; CIA report, "North Korea’s Nuclear Efforts," April 28, 1987; and CIA, "North Korea’s Expanding Nuclear Efforts," May 3, 1988.


On the Perry review, see for example Talking Points in re Perry Review of Korea policy, ca. 1999; Memorandum, Perry Review, ca. 1999; Memorandum, Larkin to Sherman, “Secretary Perry’s Meetings Wednesday, January 13 with Members of Congress on North Korea Policy,” January 12, 1999; and Memorandum, Larkin to Sherman, “Secretary Perry’s Meetings Wednesday, February 10 with Members of Congress on North Korea Policy,” February 9, 1999.


Economy,” October 19, 2000. There are a significant number of INR intelligence briefs and assessments dealing with a wide range of South Korean economic and financial issues.

31 For a good discussion of these themes in U.S.-South Korea relations, see the contribution by Seung Young Kim to Wampler, ed., *Trilateralism and Beyond*.


38 There are numerous briefing materials and cables dealing with the presidential and secretary of state meetings with South Korean leaders and officials during the Reagan and Bush I administrations. A sampling includes Cable, U.S. Embassy Seoul to Secretary of State, “The Vice President’s Meeting with President Chun,” April 29, 1982; Memorandum, Shultz to Reagan, “Korea – Your Meetings with President Chun,” November 1, 1983; State Department Cable, “Official-Informal [memorandum of conversation of
private meeting between President Reagan and President Chun at the Blue House in Seoul, Korea at 2:30 p.m. November 12, 1983; November 18, 1983; Cable, U.S. Embassy Seoul to Secretary of State, “The Secretary’s Meeting with President Chun Doo-Hwan,” March 7, 1987; Cable, USDEL Secretary in Japan to Secretary of State, “Luncheon for Secretary Shultz by President Roh Tae Woo,” July 18, 1988; “Vice President’s Trip to Asia,” September 19-28, 1989, Korea and Japan Briefing Book, September 13, 1989; Memorandum, Roy to Scowcroft, “Talking Points for the President’s Use in His October 17, 1989 Meeting and Lunch with Korea President Roh,” October 6, 1989; Memorandum, Secretary of State Baker to President Bush, “Official Working Visit of President Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea,” October 13, 1989; Cable, Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy Seoul, “October 17, 1989 Cabinet Meeting between President Bush and ROK President Roh,” November 4, 1989.


See for example Cable, U.S. Embassy Seoul to Secretary of State, “Your Visit to Seoul,” November 4, 1994; Memorandum, Brill to Sens, “Talking Points for President Clinton’s Meeting with Korean President Kim Young Sam”, July 21, 1995; State Department Memorandum to Clinton, “Your Meeting with South Korea President Kim Young Sam,” April 16, 1996, Cheju Island, ROK, ca. April 16, 1996; Cable, U.S. Embassy Seoul to Secretary of State, “South Korea in Transition: Key Policy Issues and Background for the Secretary’s Visit,” February 14, 1997; Cable, Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy Seoul, “Secretary’s Meeting with Yoo Chong Ha, Foreign Minister of Korea, Seoul, February 22, 1997,” February 27, 1997; Memorandum, Albright to Clinton, “Your Meeting with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung,” ca. June 25, 1999; Memorandum, Roth to Pickering, “Your Participation in the President’s Meetings with Republic of Korea President Kim Dae-jung, June 30, 1999; Memorandum, Roth to Sherman, “Your Meeting with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, July 2, 5:00 p.m., Blair House,” June 30, 1999; Briefing Paper, “Points to be Made for Meeting with President Kim Dae-Jung of the Republic of Korea,” ca. August 30, 2000; Memorandum, Roth to Secretary of State, “Your Participation in the President’s Meeting with ROK President Kim Dae-Jung, September 7, 9:45-10:15 a.m., TBD,” ca. August 22, 2000.